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Should Intangible Drilling Costs Be Capitalized? 
By S. S. Webster, Jr.
It may seem to the reader that the question as to whether 
so-called intangible drilling and development costs incurred in 
the drilling of oil and gas wells should, for income tax purposes, 
be capitalized or deducted as expenses, is one about which so 
much has been said and written that the sum total of human 
knowledge would not be advanced by further discussion of the 
subject.
There are, however, some phases of the question that, in view 
of the recent decisions of the United States supreme court, would 
seem to justify a reexamination of the matter by those tax­
payers to whom such a course of action is now possible.
So far as I am aware, the first official pronouncement on the 
subject appeared as article 223 of treasury regulations 45, inter­
preting the revenue act of 1918, in which it is provided that:
“Such incidental expenses as are paid for wages, fuel, repairs, 
hauling, etc., in connection with the exploration of the property, 
drilling of wells, building of pipe lines, and development of the 
property may at the option of the taxpayer be deducted as an 
operating expense or charged to the capital account returnable 
through depletion.”
The promulgation of this regulation has perhaps caused more 
discussion among accountants, income-tax practitioners and 
taxpayers than any other, for the reason that on its face it seems to 
violate sound accounting principles. It was, no doubt, adopted 
in recognition of the hazardous nature of the oil business and to 
encourage the exploration and development of the country’s oil 
reserves that at that time seemed in a fair way toward early 
depletion. Although this condition has been largely rectified 
during recent years by the discovery of vast reserves of oil, 
article 223 has been repeated in substantially the same form in 
successive treasury regulations interpreting the various revenue 
acts since the act of 1918, until today it stands as the recognized 
administrative procedure in our income-tax practice. Despite 
this fact, it is the almost universal opinion of the accountants 
and income-tax practitioners with whom I have come in contact 
that the practice permitted by the regulation is, from the purely 
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accounting point of view, wrong both in theory and practice. 
It is perhaps safe to say, however, that the members of the 
accounting profession, in spite of their convictions, have not 
hesitated to advise their clients to take full advantage of the 
regulation in question.
It was at first believed by many taxpayers that article 223, 
in view of the reference therein to “building of pipe lines, and 
development of the property,” permitted them to charge to 
expense all amounts paid for wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, etc., 
no matter whether they were incurred in the drilling of wells and 
the development of oil production, or in the construction of 
permanent buildings and structures, casinghead gasoline extrac­
tion plants, dehydration plants, etc., which relate to the produc­
tion of oil and gas after it has been discovered rather than to the 
exploration for such minerals. Article 223 of regulations 45 and 
the corresponding articles of succeeding regulations were restated 
and clarified to conform with administrative practice by treasury 
decision 4333, promulgated March 30, 1932, so as to remove any 
doubt that such expenditures incurred for facilities, equipment 
and structures and not incident to or necessary for the drilling of 
wells are not subject to the option.
During the war and immediate post-war years when the high 
war and excess-profits taxes were in effect, as for instance, under 
the act of 1918 where the war profits tax rate was 80 per cent and 
the excess-profits tax rate ran as high as 65 per cent, it was 
clearly to the advantage of taxpayers to elect under the option 
granted in article 223 to charge intangible drilling and develop­
ment costs to expenses in their income-tax returns. This was 
true even though taxpayers who were allowed discovery values 
under the act of 1918 could, in many instances, if these expendi­
tures were capitalized, add them to the capital sum returnable 
through depletion, thus tending to increase their allowances for 
depletion. This will be apparent when it is realized that deple­
tion sustained in any given year on an oil property is computed 
on the basis that the production of oil within the year bears to 
the total recoverable reserves of oil estimated to be under the 
property, and that on this basis only a portion of the capitalized 
development costs would be reflected in the annual allowance for 
depletion.
The discovery provisions of the revenue act of 1918 were 
difficult to administer accurately and were prolific of many con­
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troversies between taxpayers and the bureau of internal revenue, 
because the determination of the discovery value of an oil 
property was necessarily predicated upon an estimate of the 
underground recoverable reserves of oil. Such estimates, even 
when made by the most eminent geologists and petroleum 
engineers, have been found to contain a large margin of error. 
Geologists and engineers who were employed by taxpayers to 
estimate the reserves under their properties naturally made their 
estimates high for the purposes of trading with the bureau engi­
neers, and as a result the depletion allowances based upon such 
discovery values were in many cases sufficient to reduce mate­
rially, if not entirely to eliminate, the taxable income. Whether 
or not as a result of this condition, it is a fact that in the revenue 
act of 1921 the allowance for discovery depletion was limited to 
the statutory net income from the property on which the dis­
covery was made, and in the revenue act of 1924 the allowance 
was further limited to 50 per cent of the statutory net income 
from the property.
These subsequent limitations upon the application of the 
discovery provisions made it even less probable that there would 
be any advantage to taxpayers in the capitalization of intangible 
drilling and development costs, as the depletion allowances, based 
solely on the discovery values, were usually sufficient to make the 
limitations applicable without any addition for the amortization 
of capitalized development costs.
It is interesting to note that notwithstanding the fact that in 
the original article 223 of treasury regulations 45, it is specifically 
provided that such expenditures as therein described may at the 
option of the taxpayer be deducted as an operating expense “or 
charged to the capital account returnable through depletion,” 
many taxpayers who, through oversight or force of circumstances, 
had capitalized their intangible drilling and development costs, 
insisted that these were returnable through depreciation rather 
than through depletion. The reason for this position is no doubt 
to be found in article 223 itself, which provides:
“If in exercising this option the taxpayer charges these inci­
dental expenses to capital account, in so far as such expense is 
represented by physical property it may be taken into account in 
determining a reasonable allowance for depreciation.”
The majority of taxpayers, and their accountants and tax 
advisors, who found themselves in the position of having capital­
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ized these costs (I dislike the term “expenses” applied to these 
costs for reasons previously stated) stoutly maintained, and not 
without some reason, that an oil well was “physical property” 
notwithstanding the obvious attempt in article 223 to distin­
guish between wages, fuel, repairs, etc., incident to the drilling 
of oil wells and items incurred in the acquisition and con­
struction of equipment, facilities and structures. They con­
tended that the drilling of a hole in the ground was a necessary 
preliminary to the setting of pipe and casing for the production 
of oil and gas, and that when this was done the completed project 
consisted of an indivisible whole, denominated as an oil well, and 
not two separate investments, one of which applied to and in­
creased the cost of the oil reserves and the other represented by 
the casing and pipe in the hole.
The controversy between the bureau of internal revenue and 
taxpayers over the manner in which capitalized development 
costs should be returned for income taxation covered a period of 
many years. While the dispute was going on, congress enacted 
the revenue act of 1926, applicable to 1925 and subsequent years, 
from which the discovery provisions of the prior revenue acts 
were omitted. In their place a new method was provided for 
determining reasonable allowances for depletion. This method 
will be found in section 204 (c) 2 of that act, in which it is pro­
vided that in the case of oil and gas wells the allowance for de­
pletion shall be 27½ per cent of the gross income from the 
property during the taxable year, but that such allowance shall 
not exceed 50 per cent of the net income of the taxpayer (com­
puted without allowance for depletion) from the property. In 
no case, however, was the depletion allowance to be less than it 
would be if computed without reference to this section—that is, 
if the depletion sustained by the taxpayer on the basis of the 
cost or March 1, 1913, value of its properties exceeded the allow­
ance based on the percentage provisions of section 204 (c) 2, 
then the higher depletion would be allowable.
Upon the enactment of the revenue act of 1926, treasury 
regulations 69 were promulgated pursuant thereto, in which 
article 223 and corresponding articles of the prior regulations 
were incorporated without substantial change. However, on 
account of the radical change in the method of computing 
depletion allowances under the revenue act of 1926, taxpayers, 
by administrative rulings, I. T. 2338 and T. D. 4025, issued in 
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June, 1927, were given a new election under article 223 of 
treasury regulations 69 for the year 1925 with respect to the 
deducting as expense or capitalizing expenditures made for 
wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, etc., in the drilling of wells, building 
of pipe lines and development of the property.
In view of the enactment of the new percentage depletion 
provisions of the act of 1926, and the new election granted under 
article 223 of regulations 69 for the year 1925, it behooved tax­
payers engaged in the oil and gas industry to give serious con­
sideration to the respective advantages and disadvantages of 
deducting as expense or capitalizing intangible drilling and 
development costs, for an election made in returns for the year 
1925 would govern their procedure in respect to this item for all 
subsequent years, or at least until some further radical departure 
from the recognized methods of computing depletion allowances 
might give rise to a new election.
The importance of a proper election in this matter was further 
emphasized by the uncertainty as to the ultimate decision of the 
supreme court as to whether such costs, if capitalized, were 
returnable through depreciation or depletion. While general 
business, including the oil industry, was at that time still profit­
able, the tremendous profits of the war years had in large measure 
disappeared, and it might happen that if an election were made 
to deduct these costs as expense a loss for income-tax purposes 
might thereby be created and full benefit would not be received 
from their deduction. On the other hand, if the supreme court 
should hold that capitalized intangible drilling and development 
costs should be returned through depreciation, a proratable 
spread of these costs over a period of years as depreciation might 
result in a greater income-tax saving in the aggregate than if they 
had been deducted as expense in the years in which they were 
incurred.
If the decision of the supreme court on the question should be 
to uphold the practice and contentions of the bureau of internal 
revenue that intangible drilling costs when capitalized should be 
returned only through depletion, it would perhaps in a great 
majority of cases have absolutely no effect on the total depletion 
allowance computed in accordance with the percentage pro­
visions of the act of 1926. This is true for the reason that 
percentage depletion is allowable, notwithstanding the fact that 
there may be little or no depletion sustained on the basis of cost 
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or March 1, 1913, value. It is inherent in the nature of the oil 
business that the value of an oil property is in many cases the 
result of development and drilling operations and that the 
acquisition cost is relatively small. Leases are secured at little or 
no cost, and even when a bonus is paid for a lease it usually 
represents only a small part of the value of the property if oil and 
gas production is developed in any substantial quantity.
In one of the first cases submitted to the United States board 
of tax appeals on this point, namely that of A. T. Jergins Trust, 
decided March 5, 1931, the board agreed with the contention of 
the taxpayer that intangible drilling and development costs 
when capitalized were returnable through depreciation. This 
case was appealed to the circuit court of appeals, ninth circuit, 
but that court decided the case in favor of the taxpayer on other 
grounds and did not find it necessary to rule on the treatment of 
development costs. The next case decided by the board of tax 
appeals on this issue was that of Petroleum Exploration Company, 
promulgated June 29, 1931, in which it followed its earlier 
decision in the Jergins case, but on appeal the circuit court of 
appeals, fourth circuit, October 3, 1932, reversed the board.
Shortly after the decisions of the board of tax appeals were 
rendered in the Jergins and Petroleum Exploration cases, the 
United States court of claims in the case of Dakota-Montana Oil 
Company, decided July 5, 1932, followed the decisions of the 
board and held that drilling and development costs were the 
proper subject of a depreciation allowance which should have 
been made in addition to that for depletion. The United States 
supreme court granted certiorari in order to resolve a conflict 
between these decisions, and on March 13, 1933, handed down 
its decisions in all three of the cases, reversing the board of tax 
appeals and the court of claims and holding that intangible 
drilling and development costs when capitalized were returnable 
only through depletion.
The first step in the computation of depletion sustained on the 
cost of an oil property involves an estimate of the recoverable 
underground reserves in barrels. The estimate number of 
barrels is then divided into the capital sum returnable, consisting 
of the cost of the property and any additions in the way of 
capitalized development costs, and the resultant unit cost per 
barrel is multiplied by the number of barrels produced during 
the year to determine the amount of cost depletion sustained.
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If the cost of an oil property is small in relation to its value, it 
follows that the depletion sustained on cost will be dispropor­
tionate to a depletion allowance computed on the basis of 27½ 
per cent, of the gross income from the property, even though 
limited to 50 per cent of the net income from the property. If, 
therefore, intangible drilling and development costs are capital­
ized and included in the costs returnable through depletion, it is 
obvious that the cost depletion will thereby be increased, but in 
the majority of cases that have come to my attention the result 
has been merely to narrow the spread between cost and per­
centage depletion, without increasing the allowable depletion, 
and without any benefit to the taxpayer.
It is, of course, undeniably true in the case of the purchase of a 
proven tract or lease, where the cost fairly approximates the true 
value of the property, that the depletion on cost will in many 
cases exceed a depletion allowance computed on the percentage 
basis. In such cases the addition of capitalized intangible 
drilling and development costs will serve to increase the deple­
tion allowance based on cost, and to the extent that such deple­
tion on cost exceeds normal percentage depletion will result in a 
more uniform and equitable return of costs, as to which, from a 
purely accounting standpoint, there never should have been an 
election on the part of taxpayers either to capitalize or to deduct 
as expense. The decision whether to capitalize or to treat such 
costs as expense will rest, in the case of such taxpayers, on the 
relation which their high cost properties bear to their total 
depletable properties. If, as is the case with one or two tax­
payers that have come to my attention, practically all their 
properties have been acquired as the result of the purchase of 
proven tracts and leases, it will unquestionably be to their ad­
vantage to capitalize intangible drilling and development ex­
penses and return them ratably over the years of their life through 
the medium of depletion deductions.
It is further conceivably to the advantage of a taxpayer to 
capitalize his drilling costs, even though the acquisition cost of his 
leases is small, if the drilling requirements of the leases are such 
that practically all of the development and exploration work 
must be done in a relatively short time. As the drilling ex­
penditures must be made largely prior to the time production is 
obtained, it may well be that classifying these costs as expense 
would create a large loss for the year or years covered by the 
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development, which could not be claimed in any subsequent year, 
the carry-over provisions of the revenue act of 1932 and prior 
revenue acts having been repealed, as of January 1, 1933, by 
section 218 (a) of the national industry recovery act, approved 
June 16, 1933.
In the years prior to 1925 it had been the practice of the 
bureau of internal revenue not to require taxpayers engaged in the 
oil industry to include intangible drilling and development costs, 
even when charged to expense, in determining the net income 
from the property for the purpose of applying the limitation on 
discovery depletion. There seemed little justification for this 
practice if such costs, for income-tax purposes, were in fact 
operating expenses as is indicated in the portion of article 223 of 
treasury regulations 45 quoted at the beginning of this article. 
Upon the enactment of the revenue act of 1926, in which the 
discovery depletion provisions were superseded, in the case of oil 
and gas wells, by percentage depletion, the treasury department, 
by administrative ruling, G. C. M. 2315, issued December, 1927, 
construed the term “net income of the taxpayer from the prop­
erty” as used in section 204 (c) 2 relating to percentage depletion, 
as requiring taxpayers who had elected to treat development 
expenditures as ordinary and necessary business expenses to 
deduct them in determining the net income from the property, 
which is used as a limitation in the computation of the depletion 
allowance based on income. This requirement may. in some 
cases so reduce the statutory “net income of the taxpayer from 
the property” that the 50 per cent limitation may become 
operative, whereas if such expenditures were capitalized, the 
amortization is by the decisions of the supreme court classified 
as depletion, which is specifically excluded by the statute in the 
determination of net income from the property.
A pretty question of law suggests itself as a result of the ruling 
of the treasury department respecting the treatment of intangible 
development costs, when classified as expense, in the determina­
tion of “net income,” as reflected in G. C. M. 2315. The defini­
tion of “net income” as used in section 214 (a) 10 of the revenue 
act of 1921 and section 204 (c) of the act of 1924, relative to the 
limitation on discovery depletion in the case of oil and gas wells, 
is in no material degree different from the definition in section 204 
(c) 2 of the revenue act of 1926, relating to the limitation on 
percentage depletion. The first time an administrative inter- 
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pretation of “net income” was required was in the act of 1921, 
when the allowance for discovery depletion was limited to the 
net income from the property on which the discovery was made
When congress reenacted this definition of “net income” in the 
revenue acts of 1924 and 1926 without substantial change, it 
must have been aware of the administrative construction placed 
upon it by the treasury department. It is, I am informed, in 
accordance with tradition that when congress reenacted this 
provision without substantial change in successive revenue acts, 
it gave implied legislative approval to the interpretation placed 
upon it by the treasury department, and that therefore G. C. M. 
2315 purporting differently to define “net income” is void and 
without force or effect.
It seems to me that there is another consideration that has a 
direct bearing on the validity of G. C. M. 2315—that is the 
apparent transformation of the character of intangible develop­
ment costs from depletion when capitalized to depreciation or 
amortization when carried as expense. The United States 
supreme court has said that intangible development costs when 
capitalized are returnable through depletion—therefore, they 
are or must partake of the nature of depletion, and as such are not 
required by the statute to be deducted in determining statutory 
“net income.” If, instead of being capitalized and returned 
ratably over the life of the property, they are deducted wholly as 
expense in the year in which they are incurred, is the deduction 
to be characterized as something other than “depletion,” such as 
operating expense, depreciation or amortization? It is a difficult 
question, and will no doubt have to be resolved by the courts.
The entire question as to the treatment of intangible develop­
ment costs is, of course, academic as to companies which have 
been in existence for a number of years, and have already made 
their elections either to capitalize or to treat such costs as ex­
pense, unless some further radical departure in the method of 
computing depletion allowances should take place. To the 
newly organized units of the oil industry, and to those that have 
had no opportunity to make an election under article 236 of 
treasury regulations 77, the question is of paramount importance 
in the determination of their future income-tax liability.
In summing up it may be said generally that (a) where the 
acquisition cost of a taxpayer is small in relation to the value of 
its properties and the income obtained therefrom, it will be to its 
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advantage to deduct as expense intangible drilling and develop­
ment costs and, conversely, (b) where the properties have been 
acquired as a result of the purchase of proven tracts or leases, and 
the cost is commensurate with the value, it will be advantageous 
to capitalize such expenditures.
There are, of course, exceptions to every rule, and no doubt 
many of my readers can suggest situations other than those out­
lined here where it might be to the advantage or disadvantage of a 
given taxpayer to adopt one or the other of the indicated courses 
of action. The truth is that no fixed rule can be laid down that 
would be desirable for all members of the industry, and the 
decision in each case must be predicated upon the circumstances 
peculiar to the individual taxpayer.
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